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SOME ASPECTS OF THE LAW OF GRATUITOUS
PROMISES IN ILLINOIS
I
Liability upon a simple promise not under seal is predicated on the requirement of consideration,' currently defined as a promise or an act "bargained
for and given in exchange for the promise."2 While this narrow definition of a
promissory obligation has at times been the subject of mild criticism3 and even
the occasion of sportive comment,4 the literature in general has been chiefly
concerned with the refinement of this bargain element contemplated by the
doctrine of consideration.5 Recently, however, writers have begun to question
the very doctrine itself, and to advocate vigorously the abolition of consideration as the exclusive test of liability upon a promise.'
Some promises, of course, have been enforced even though no true consideration was given therefor. For instance, courts have upheld a promise to pay
a debt barred by the statute of limitation, or discharged in bankruptcy, or
unenforceable because of infancy; and have resorted to highly questionable
constructions to obviate the rigorous requirements of the consideration doctrine. 7 But while fictions may have succeeded in keeping the doctrine intact,
a more realistic view recognizes such promises to be enforceable without consideration. 8
In recent years attention has been called to the fact that courts have been
enforcing gratuitous promises9 under such legal rubrics as fraud, waiver, and
estoppel. None of these categories can be employed without doing some violence to their traditional meaning. Moreover, such gratuitous promises, disguised as they were under fictions, have been confined to isolated situations,
with almost no cross-reference between them. The general underlying rule has
xDistinguish the "window dressing" obligations, where a promise is enforceable without
consideration because it operates as a fraud upon a third party. See 5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 296
(1938).
2 Rest.,

Contracts § 75 (i932).
Salmond, Jurisprudence 374 et seq. (7th ed. 1924); Markby, Elements of Law § 637 (4th
ed. 1889).
4 See Jessel, M. R. in Couldery v. Bartum, L.R. Ch. D. 394, 399 (i88o).
s Langdell, Mutual Promises as a Consideration for Each Other, 14 Harv. L. Rev. 496
(igoi); Williston, Mutual Assent in the Formation of Contracts, 14 Ill.
L. Rev. 85 (i919).
6Ballantine, Is the Doctrine of Consideration Senseless and Illogical, ii Mich. L. Rev.
3

423 (1913); Arterburn, Liability for Breach of Gratuitous Promises, 22 Il.L. Rev. 161 (1927);
Wright, Ought the Doctrine of Consideration to Be Abolished from the Common Law, 49
Harv. L. Rev. 1225 (1936); Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ, 35 Mich. L. Rev.
908 (1937).
7 See i Williston, Contracts c. vii (rev. ed. 1936).

8Ibid. On the relation of letters of credit to consideration see Thayer, Irrevocable Credits
in International Commerce: Their Legal Effects, 37 Col. L. Rev. X326 (i937). On the seal and
consideration see i Williston, op. cit. su~pra note 7, at §§ 217-21 9 A.
9 Note 6 supra. See also Sharp, Notes on Contract Problems and Comparative Law, 3
Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 277 (1936).
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been formulated by the Restatement in the following terms: "A promise which
the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance of a
definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does
induce such action or forebearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise. ' Io
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that under Section 90 courts
will not be called upon to enforce all gratuitous promises upon which the promisee has reasonably relied to his detriment. There will still remain the task of
distinguishing and excluding from the operation of the stated rule social engagements or friendly accommodations." The difficulty may be all the more acute
since gratuitous promises will normally occur among friends, neighbors, business associates and members of the family. This consideration, however, should
merely serve as a caveat in the application of Section 9o.
With the promise as the source of the obligation, pertinent inquiry turns to
the extent of the liability. It is arguable that since liability is predicated upon
a promise, the measure of damages should be determined by the expectation
interest as in the ordinary contract cases." On the other hand, it has been
suggested that the extent of damages should be determined by the actual
losses sustained by the promisee in reliance upon the promise. 3 It would seem
preferable, however, not to set up any fixed rule, but rather to permit the courts
to fix damages as the exigencies of the particular case demand.4 A detailed
analysis of the cases so indicates.
II
The charitable subscription cases are clear examples of the legal enforcement of a gratuitous promise.'5 In Beatty v. Western College'6 the court held that
Rest., Contracts §
R0

90 (1932).

" "It would be exceedingly hurtful to the freedom of social intercourse to create even a
suspicion in the public mind that those kind offers of advice and assistance, which take place
among friends and kindred, could be converted into contracts which the law would enforce."
Richards v. Richards, 46 Pa. St. 78, 82 (1863). See also i Goble, Cases and Materials on Contracts 397 (1937).
" See on this point, Fuller and Purdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46
Yale L. J. 52, 63 etseq. (1936).
The term "promissory estoppel" tends to permit recovery of contract damages. Spelled out
the term implies that under certain circumstances the promisor will be estopped from asserting
lack of consideration. Promissory estoppel under this form is a substitute for consideration
and leads easily to a uniform rule of contract damages. The words "gratuitous promise" give
a neutral effect and might, therefore, be preferable.
's Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts, 46 Harv. L. Rev. x,
22 e.seq. (1932). See also Cohen,The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv.L. Rev. 553,578 ef seq. (1933).
'4 See Fuller and Purdue, op. cit. supranote 12, at 4O etseq.
ISSee Billig, The Problem of Consideration in Charitable Subscriptions, 12 Corn. L. Q. 467
(1927); Humble, Promissory Estoppel in the Law of Contracts, 63 Am. L. Rev. 33 (1929). On

the Illinois cases, see, Murtaugh, Charitable Subscriptions in Illinois, 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 430

(1937).

,6177 Ill. 280,
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N.E. 432 (1898). The courts have generally predicated recovery on the
263 (i86i); Griswold v. Board of
25 Ill.

theory of detrimental reliance: Pryor v. Cain,
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the donor was legally bound by his promise when expenditures had been made
in reliance upon such promise. But, in Pratt v. Trustees of the Baptist Society
of Elgin, 7 where no liabilities had been incurred, the court held that the subscription was a mere offer and was automatically revoked by the death of the
subscriber. In an early case recovery was allowed on the ground that the labor
in obtaining other subscriptions was sufficient consideration for the promise. 8
Since such labor would generally be present in all subscription drives the requirement of injurious reliance would become superfluous. But, on the authority of the Prattcase, this approach has been rejected.9 On similar grounds
the court repudiated the theory that the subscription of others may constitute
consideration." The Appellate Court in In re Wheeler's Estate," however, fictionally treated as a bargain transaction what would normally be considered
a gift. The court indicated that the promise, by the charity, to apply the funds
properly was sufficient consideration for the subscriber's promise." While reference to consideration in the charitable subscription cases has been criticized,
their persistent appearance indicates the courts' determination to protect the
reasonable expectations of charitable institutions.23 Whether or not the Supreme Court will follow the Wheeler or the Pratt case cannot be determined
with any certainty. Perhaps a statute may be necessary to make at least a
charitable subscription binding even though no reliance had been suffered
4
upon it.2
In the light of section go requiring substantial action or forebearance to
recover on the promise, it is interesting to note that in Trustees of M. E. Church
of Illiopolis v. Garvey,25 the court permitted recovery even though the charity
had, on the faith of the subscription, merely borrowed money to pay a pre26 Ill. 41 (i86x); Trustees of M. E. Church of Illiopolis v.
Garvey, 53 IL. 401 (1870); Richelieu Hotel v. International Military Encampment Co., 140

Trustees of Peoria University,
Ill. 248, 29

N.E.

io44 (1892);

Old Presbyterian Church v. The Estate of James Paxton, i8o

Ill. App. 658 (1913).
17 93 Ill. 475 (,879).
Accord: Beach v. First M. E. Church, 96 Ill. 177 (188o) (offer revoked
by insanity).
is See Kentucky Baptist Education Society v. Carter, 72 InI. 247 (1874).
9Augustine v. Trustees of M. E. Society, 79 Ill. App. 452 (i898).
In Trustees of
20 See Cutwright v. Preachers' Aid Society, 271 Ill. App. 168, 171 (1933).
M. E. Church v. Garvey, 53 Ill. 401, 403 (1870) the court had reserved decision on this question.
21 284 Ill. App. 132, x N.E. (2d) 425 (1936).
See also Allegheny College v. Nat. Chautauqua
Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927).
-For criticism of the consideration theory in the charitable subscription cases see i Williston, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 116.
" See Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Harris, 359 Ill. 86, 194 N.E. 250

(1935).
24For form of such a statute see Bllig, op. cit. supranote i, at 480.
2s 53 Ill. 401 (1870).
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existing debt. The decision of this case is somewhat fortified by the fact that,
besides occasional dicta,26 the Illinois courts have not inquired into the extent
of a charity's reliance. This is probably sound, particularly since the income
from subscriptions may frequently be used not for purposes of expansion but
to meet current liabilities and expenses. It is suggested, therefore, that Section
90 should accordingly be modified so far as charitable subscriptions are concerned.7
The enforcement of promises without consideration invites examination of
the extent of liability in cases of gratuitous bailments and agencies. Thus it
is clear that a gratuitous bailee, though not obligated to undertake the bailment, is liable in tort for gross negligence regarding the goods of which possession had been taken.21 Moreover, there are indications that in Illinois a surrender of possession would be sufficient to create liability against a gratuitous
bailee on a promise wholly collateral to the bailment.29 The Court of Appeals
of New York has definitely committed itself to such a view in Siegel v. Spear
& Co.,3o where a gratuitous bailee was held liable on his promise to insure the
goods of which he had taken possession. However, since courts have chosen
to speakin terms of consideration,31 a bare promise unaccompanied by surrender
of possession will not be enforced, even though the promisee has suffered a
pecuniary loss on the strength of the promise.32
Similarly, as to the gratuitous agent, the Illinois court has said that once
having initiated performance he has the obligations of any other agent.33 Thus
he must inform the principal of any relevant information obtained in the course
of his agency, 34 and cannot use such information for his own benefit or to the
detriment of the principal's interest. 35 And it was held in Evan L. Reed Mfg.
26 See Pryor v. Cain, 25 Il. 263, 265 (i86r); Miller v. Ballard, 46111377,38o (x868).
These
cases suggest that the measure of recovery should be determined by the amount of reliance.
27 As to pre-incorporation stock subscriptions see: i Williston, op. cit. supra note 7, at
§ 11S; Stevens, Corporations §§ 83, 84 (1936); Uniform Business Corporations Act, § 6; Ill.
Bus. Corp. Act 1933, § 16, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, c. 32, § 157.16.
28Gray v. Merriam, 148 Ill. 179, 35 N.E. 8io (1893). For view that liability of bailee is in
tort see: Winfield, The Province of the Law of Tort, c. v. (1931); Anson, Principles of the Law
of Contract § i33 (sth Am. ed. 1930); cf. Beale, Gratuitous Undertakings, 5 Harv. L. Rev.
222 (189i) (liability is sui generis).

9See

Whitesides v. Cook, 20 Ill. App. 574 (1886).
414 (1923). For a discussion of analogous cases see, Arterburn,

234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E.
op. cit. supranote 6.
30

31 On this point see 32 Yale L. J. 6og
cit. supra note 7, at § 138.

(1923);

23 Col. L. Rev. 573 (1923); 1 Williston, op.

32This result is also based on a distinction between misfeasance and non-feasance. See generally Story, Bailments §§ 164-17id (8th ed. 1870). For a contrary view see Jones, Bailments
55 et seq. (4th ed. 1833).

33 Casey v. Casey, 14 Ill. 112 (1852); Dennis v. McCagg, 32 Ill. 429, 444 (1863). His liabil-

ity, however, is limited to gross negligence. Hindman v. Borders, 89 Ill. 336 (z878).
34 Rest., Agency § 381 (1933).
3sId., at § 387.
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Co. v. W-urts3 6 that a gratuitous agent, who by his negligence had procured a

defective insurance policy, was liable to the principal for the resulting loss.
Although authorities agree that if the agent had not entered upon performance
he would not be liable,37 on principle it is difficult to distinguish between a
failure to obtain a valid policy and not getting one at all.3S Thus, in either case
the agent should be liable if there has been justifiable reliance on the agent's
promise and the principal has suffered a detriment. The Restatement of
Agency, following Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts provides that
a gratuitous agent is liable in both situations, unless he has informed the principal, prior to a change in position, that he will not perform.39
Under certain circumstances courts of equity have granted specific relief
upon a promise to make a gift of land.40 It has been said that the promisee's
assumption of possession and his making of valuable improvements constitute
consideration for the promise.41 But it would seem that a bargain relationship
was not contemplated by the parties.42 The proof of the promise to make the
gift must be clear and unequivocal.43 This is especially necessary where the
parties are closely related, since in such a case a mere accommodation might
easily be taken for a promise.44
3 187 Ill. App. 378 (i914); Shapiro v. Amalgamated Trust & Savings Bank, 283 Ill. App.
243 (1935) (whether agent was to be reimbursed for its services is not mentioned). Accord:
Barile v. Wright, 256 N.Y. I, 175 N.E. 351 (1931).
37 Thore v. Deas, 4 Johns. (N.Y.) 84 (I8og); Comfort v. McCorkle, 149 Misc. 826, 268
N.Y. Supp. 192 (I933); I Mechem, Agency § 1258 (2d ed. 1914); 2 Joyce, The Law of Insurance § 68o (2d ed. 19I7).
3 The difficulty becomes all the more evident when the principal gave the gratuitous agent
money to pay for policy. By analogy the agent should be liable.
39 "One who, by a gratuitous promise or other conduct which he should realize will cause
another reasonably to rely upon the performance of definite acts of service by him as the other's
agent, causes the other to refrain from having such acts done by other available means is subject to a duty to use care to perform such services or, while other means are available, to give
notice that he will not perform." Rest., Agency § 378 (1933); see also § 4o.
40 See McClintock, Equity § 57 (1936).
41 "A court of equity will always enforce a promise upon which reliance is placed, and which
induces the expenditure of labor and money in the improvement of land. Such a promise rests
upon a valuable consideration. The promisee acts upon the faith of the promise. We can perceive no important distinction between such a promise and a sale." Kurtz v. Hibner, 55 Ill.
514, 521 (X870).
42 Pound, Consideration in Equity, x3 Ill. L. Rev. 667, 671 et seq. (1gg).
43 See Geer v. Goudy, 174 Ill. 514, 521, 51 N.E. 623, 625 (1898); Langston v. Bates, 84 Ill.
524, 525 (1877).
44 In Burgess v. Burgess, 3o6 Ill. I9, 21, 137 N.E. 403,404 (1922), the court said that "where
the contract is by a father to convey land to a child, the evidence is to be considered in view of
the relation between the parties, which might indicate possession either under a contract or
permissively as a benefit to the child."
Generally, the gift cases involve oral promises; but the rule of part performance is sufficient
to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds.
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In regard to the extent of detrimental reliance necessary to obtain specific
performance the courts have generally indicated that such relief will be granted
to prevent fraud upon or injustice against the promisee.45 Despite this general
language courts seldom inquire into the value of the permanent improvements
made upon the land. In Clany v. Flusky46 specific relief was granted even
though the improvements were slight. However, where the promise of the gift
was in return for services to be performed, specific relief is usually granted
only where the statute of limitations has run and the value of the services
approximated the value of the land.47 The distinction is perhaps questionable,
especially since, under certain circumstances, the court granted only quasi8
contractual relief even though permanent improvements had been made.4
Finally, a consideration of the license cases is relevant. It is generally
accepted that the mere fact that consideration is paid for a license does not
make it irrevocable.49 Moreover, as to cases where a gratuitous licensee, to
avail himself of the license, has substantially changed his position, the courts
have shown no unanimity of treatment. A minority of courts have contended
that the license is translated into an easement.50 But the majority, charging
the licensee with knowledge of the law, have held that he cannot claim to have
been misled to his detriment.s5 It has been suggested, however, that where
permission is given to use the land of another in some particular way, it becomes a matter of construction as to the character of the interest purported
to be created. On the basis of this suggestion, it is said that the courts part
company in the construction of a mere "permission" to use the land of an4s Stephens v. Collison, 313 Ill. 365, 375,
173 N.E. 745, 747 (i93o).
46 187 Ill. 6o5, 58 N.E. 594 (1900).
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N.E. 8i, 85

(1924);

McCalister v. McCalister,

342 Ill. 231, 236,

47Willis v. Zorger, 258 Ill. 575, ioi N.E. 963 (1913); Warren v. Warren, io 5 I9. 568
287 Ill. 213, 122 N.E. 472 (i919); Weir v. Weir, 287 Ill. 495, 122
N.E. 868 (i919); Edwards v. Brown, 308 Ill. 350, 139 N.E. 618 (1923); Holsz v. Stephen, 362
Ill. 527, 2oo N.E. 6oi (1936) (probably distinguishable on fact that it involved a promise to

(1883); Aldrich v. Aldrich,

bequeath in return for services).
48 Thus in Worth v. Worth, 84 Ill. 442 (1877) where the promise to convey could not be
clearly established the court permitted recovery for the valuable improvements minus the
rental value of the land. In Ranson v. Ranson, 233 ll. 369, 84 N.E. 210 (i9o8) the court,
under similar circumstances, allowed an eqbitable lien upon the premises to the extent of the
permanent improvements. It is arguable that where permanent improvements have been
made specific performance should not be uniformly granted, even though the promise to convey is clearly proved.
49 2 Tiffany, Real Property 12o6 (1920).
so See Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ, 35 Mich. L. Rev. goS, 924 etseq. (1937).
SI See i Williston, op. cit. supra, note 7 at § 139; Clark, Licenses in Real Property Law, 21
Col. L. Rev. 757, 779 et seq. (1921); Hohfeld, Faulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases,
27 Yale L. J. 66, 92 el seq. (I917).
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other.52 Courts, however, have not specifically followed this suggested analysis.53

The Illinois decisions are not in harmony. In Woodward v. Seely,54 a case of
first impression, the court denied specific relief to a gratuitous licensee who had
built a mill in reliance upon the licensor's permission to flood the latter's land.
In Russell v. Hubbard,ss however, a license was held irrevocable where the
licensee attached his building to .the adjacent wall of the licensor. The Russell
case has been subsequently limited to its facts; 6 and the rule established by
Woodward v. Seely has been generally followed.s7
Occasionally the Illinois court has indicated that equity will interfere to
prevent the revocation of a license in situations involving fraud or undue
hardship;s8 but the extent to which relief will be given was not specified. In
Girardv. The Lehigh Stone Co., 59the court seemed to open a compromise between
the two extreme positions generally taken in the license situations. In that
case, the agreement was construed as a license to discharge water across the
licensor's land. The court indicated that the licensor had no standing in equity
unless he reimbursed the licensee for his expenditures, and hence refused to
enjoin the latter's acts. It is suggested that this is a far more reasonable way
of adjusting the difficulties. 6° It will, on the one hand, adequately protect a
person who must make large expenditures to avail himself of the license; and
on the other hand avoid the manifest injustice of converting a neighborly act
61
into a grant 6f a permanent interest in the land.
In conclusion the suggestion to be found in the cases that the measure of
damages should sometimes be determined by the reliance interest may open
S2 Tiffany, Real Property 1208 et seq. (1920). Since these "licenses" are generally given
by oral declaration the court has at times argued that to make it irrevocable is to create an
interest in land by parol in contravention of the Statute of Frauds. Tanner v. Volentine, 75
Ill. 624 (1874); City of Kewanee v. Otley, 204 Ill. 402, 68 N.E. 388 (19o3). Obviously this
argument is unsound for even a fee may be created by parol in the gift cases.
53 However, in St. Louis National Stock Yards v. The Wiggins Ferry Co., 102 Ill. 514
(1882) it was specifically argued that the transaction did not contemplate a license. See also
Boland v. Walters, 346 IMI. 184, 178, N.E. 359 (1931) (court indicated that the circumstances
tended to show a license).
'4 II Il. 157 (1849).
559 I11. 335 (1871).
'6Kamphouse v. Gafiner, 73 Ill. 453, 461 (1874).
'7 The St. Louis National Stock Yards v. The Wiggins Ferry Co., 112 Ill. 384 (1885); Simpson v. Wright, 21 Ill. App. 67 (i886); Murray v. Gibson, 21 Ill. App. 488 (i886); Morse v.
Lorenz, 262 Ill. 115, io4 N.E. 237 (1914). In Entwhistle v. Henke, 211 Ill. 273, 277, 71 N.E.
99o , 991 (19o4) the court said: "If the rule is harsh and unjust in its operation, the remedy
must now be afforded by enactments of the law-making body of the State." But see note 59
infra.
58 See Baird v. Westberg, 341 Ill. 616, 618, 173 N.E. 82o, 821 (1930).
'9 280 Ill. 479, 117 N.E. 698 (I917).
61See Shattuck, op. cit. supranote 50.
61See Clark, op. cit. supra note 51, at 781.
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the way for adjusting the difficulties following the revocation of a unilateral
contract after the promisee has partly performed to his detriment. 62 Further a
frank recognition of the fact that promises may be enforced without consideration might lead to further modifications of the bargain theory of consideration.6,
THE ECONOMIC REGULATION%OF AIR TRANSPORT
Government regulation of private agencies of transportation has become a
part of our national life. Fifty years ago, the first Act to Regulate Commerce'
created the Interstate Commerce Commission, which began to regulate the
railroads; more recently the jurisdiction of the Commission has been extended
to motor carriers; 2 and now Congress is facing the problem of regulating air
transportation.3
Barely fifteen years old air transport has grown from an experiment to an
industry of national scope. Remarkable technical advance has changed flying
from a fool-hardy adventure4 to a commonplace experience, and with the
change has come a tremendous increase in the volume of air traffic.5 But despite
this growth the financial condition of the domestic airlines has steadily declined. 6 Especially since the enactment of the present Air Mail Law have
losses been heavy. In 1936 the loss totaled $9io,ooo, and in 1937 it is estimated
at $3,000,000.7 It has been said that of the 120 millions of private capital invested in the air transport industry, more than 6o millions have been lost.8
Fuller and Purdue, op. cit. supra, note 12, at 410 et seq.
6-See Report of New York Law Revision Commission 91 el seq. (1936).
124 Stat. 379 (1887), and amendments; 49 U.S.C.A. §§ x-40 (Supp. 1937).
2 Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C.A. § 30x (Supp. 1937).
62See

For the legislation at present before Congress, see note 61 infra.
the expansion of flying, both commercial and private, it became apparent as early
as 1922 that some kind of governmental regulation was necessary to safeguard the public.
Although several progressive states did enact licensing laws and some traffic regulations, they
were not very effective, as state lines mean nothing to an airplane.
Constitutional doubts over the power of the federal government to regulate into the air,
which seemed quite serious at the time, never got beyond the halls of Congress. The Air Commerce Act, 44 Stat. 468 (1926), 49 U.S.C.A. § 171 (Supp. I937), was finally enacted under the
commerce clause, on May 20, 1926. The act confers upon the Department of Commerce
jurisdiction over all civil flying, commercial and private. Created under this authority, the
Bureau of Air Commerce promulgates rules for air traffic, safety, the licensing of pilots and
equipment, and supervises the airways.
5See Tables, Annual Report of the Postmaster General, 1936, 29.
6 See Barney, The Aviation Industry, Appendix 66-67 (1937) for consolidated earnings
4 With

statement of airlines.
7 See statement of Col. Gorrell, President, Air Transport Assoc. of America, reported in
Hearings, Post Office Department, Appropriations Bill, 1939, 536.
8Ibid.

